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COASE AND THE CONSTITUTION: A NEW APPROACH TO
FEDERALISM
F.E. Guerra-Pujol*
This paper proposes a new approach to the centuries-old question of
federalism. In a word, we approach the problem offederalism from a Coasian
or property-rights perspective. That is, instead of attempting to draw an
arbitrary boundary line between state and federal spheres of power through
traditional legal or semantic analysis of the constitution and previous judicial
precedents, this paper proposes the creation of alternative 'federalism
markets" in which governmental powers and functions would be allocated to
Congress, the states, or even private firms through decentralized auction
mechanisms and secondary markets. The paper is divided into five
parts. Following a brief introduction, part two models existing federal-state
disputes as a game of chicken and provides a brief theoretical outline of our
alternative approach. Next, part three develops a simple two-part model of
federalism markets, specifically, the use of auctions as well as secondary
markets for the allocation of state-federal powers. Part four reviews and
refutes some salient technical and philosophical objections to our proposed
system offederalism markets, while part five concludes.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to begin by noting that the problem of federalism is not
peculiar to the United States but rather plagues all federal systems and
confederations, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the European
Union. On the one hand, a central authority that is powerful enough to
settle disputes between member states and solve collective action problems
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is no doubt desirable, but on the other hand, the member states should also
be powerful enough to solve purely local problems as well as check
potential abuses of power by the central authority.' In a word, the problem
of federalism can be stated as follows: what is the proper allocation of
powers between the central authority and the member states?
This paper proposes a new approach to the centuries-old question of
federalism, suggesting an approach to the problem of federalism from a
Coasian or property-rights perspective. 2 That is, instead of attempting to
draw an arbitrary boundary line between state and federal spheres of power
through traditional legal or semantic analysis of the Constitution and
previous judicial precedents, this paper proposes the creation of alternative
"federalism markets" in which governmental powers and functions would
be allocated to Congress, the states, or even private firms through
decentralized auction mechanisms and secondary markets. The remainder
of this paper, then, is divided into five parts. Following this brief
introduction, part two models existing federal-state disputes as a game of
chicken and provides a brief theoretical outline of this alternative approach
to the problem of federalism. Next, part three develops a simple two-part
model of federalism markets; specifically, the use of auctions as well as
secondary markets for the allocation of state-federal powers. Part four
reviews and refutes some salient technical and philosophical objections to
the proposed system of federalism markets, while part five concludes.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In the American context, the problem of federalism is by no means a new
one. Ever since Alexander Hamilton's and Thomas Jefferson's
historic debate over the incorporation of a national bank,3 this
question has posed a conflict: what is the proper state-federal balance of
power? The breadth of Federal Power has increased over two centuries,
from Chief Justice John Marshall's expansive interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause4 in the landmark case of McCulloch v.
Maryland5 to the enormous extension of federal powers following President
1. See, e.g., Arthur N. Halcombe, The Coercion of States in a Federal System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE
AND EMERGENT 135 (W. MacMahon, ed., 1955); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Harold Demsetz, Towvard a
Theory of Property Rights, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 347 59 (1967).
3. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-76 (16th ed.
2006).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Franklin Roosevelt's sweeping New Deal programs. 6 However, both the
law and politics of federalism are as unsettled and contentious as ever. 7
Simply put, despite the gradual enlargement of federal power since the
founding of the American Republic, or perhaps because of it, this vigorous
centuries-old legal and academic debate over the proper allocation of state-
federal authority refuses to fade away.
The traditional approach to the problem of federalism often involves
federal litigation, with the U.S. Supreme Court serving as the arbiter of
federal-state conflicts of interest.8  This paper refers to these judicial
contests as a "federalism game." In this view, federal-state conflicts of
interest-the federalism game-can be modeled as a one-shot,
simultaneous-move game of chicken in which there are two players (Player
A and Player B) driving race cars towards each other at high speeds on a
narrow, one-lane road.9 The strategy set of the drivers consists of two
choices: Swerve (S) or Drive Straight (DS).
In summary, this game produces four possible interactions and
payoff combinations:
(1) S-S. If both players swerve, both drivers obtain a zero (0) payoff although both avoid
being the sole "chicken," there is no clear winner either.
(2) DS-DS. If both players decide to drive straight, they will collide, imposing an enormous
cost (-2c) on both drivers. Essentially, both players lose.
(3) DS-S. If driver A drives straight, while driver B swerves, then A wins and B loses. That is,
A obtains a positive payoff (b) for demonstrating his resolute courage and bravery in the
face of danger. The other driver, however, by swerving, is the "chicken" and is assigned a
negative payoff(-c).
(4) S-DS. Lastly, if A swerves and B drives straight, then A is the chicken, while B is the
victor, and the payoffs are thus reversed.
Before proceeding, notice that the respective benefits and costs
corresponding with each strategy are represented in abstract terms (the
parameters b and c) rather than expressing them in terms of numerical
values (such as 1, 2, and 3) in order to illustrate the underlying logic and
structure of seemingly unrelated problems. In addition, another advantage
6. See, e.g., Alan Brinkley, The New Deal Experiments, in THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN
LIBERALISM 8-16 (William H. Chafe ed., 2003).
7. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular
Sovereignty, and Expressly Delegated Powers, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889 (2008); Robert G.
Natelson, The Enumerated Powers ofStates, 3 NEV. L. J. 469 (2003).
8. For a small sample of recent federalism cases - all decided by the narrowest of 5-4 margins, see
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779
(1995); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM POLNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILLEMA 197 201 (1993).
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of expressing these values as abstract parameters is flexibility and
generality; that is, the abstract model permits the derivation of results for
any value that these parameters might actually take. 10
Given the payoff structure of this game, Drive Straight is the best
response to Swerve because is b is clearly greater than -c. By the same
logic, Swerve is the best response to Drive Straight because -c is greater
than -2c. That is, being the chicken is preferable to being in a head-on
collision." Therefore, there are two Nash equilibrium in the game. 12
In many respects, federal-state power struggles resemble a game of
chicken because the underlying strategy set-Drive Straight or Swerve in
the game of chicken; Litigate or Back Down in the federalism game-and
the resulting payoff combinations from these interactions are strikingly
similar. Two reasons account for the similarities. First, if both sides in a
federalism dispute back down, they avoid the possibility of a head-on
collision and thus postpone the resolution of the dispute for another time.
Second, if both parties decide to litigate up to the Supreme Court, one will
always win and one will always lose, but the identity of the winner cannot
be determined at the outset, as arbitrary and unpredictable circumstances
will play a large part in the calculus of who will lose his nerve or keep his
cool in the very last second. Despite jurisprudence developed over time as
the Supreme Court has struggled to interpret the myriad applications of
federal structure within the Constitution, the Court has never adhered to a
fixed definition. 13 Even with the assistance of stare decisis, court
decisions in this area of law tend to be unpredictable and inconsistent, with
courts favoring the states in some cases and the federal government in
others.' 4 Though the Court is a third party not conceived of within the
traditional parameters of the game of chicken, forces at work in the ultimate
10. See, e.g., RICHARD MCELREATH & ROBERT BOYD, MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 6 (2007).
11. Nevertheless, the game of chicken raises an intriguing though perverse possibility in which the
worst possible outcome is to be the sole chicken due to reputation effects. That is, being the chicken
might be worse than the cost of a head-on collision if one assigns a higher value to reputation than to
safety.
12. AVENDASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 87 (2d ed. 2004) ("a Nash Equilibrium
in a game is a list of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can get a better payoff by
switching to some other strategy that is available to her while all the other players adhere to the
strategies specified for them in the list. ").
13. Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), with United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
14. Id.
A NEW APPROACH TO FEDERALISM
moment of chicken proves an apt analogy to the Court's caprice in this area
of the law. This model thus helps to explain why litigation over federalism
is a never-ending process. Might there be a better approach to the problem?
Although the problem of federalism has generated a vast and varied
academic literature, 5 no scholar has taken a market approach to the
problem. In contrast, this paper proposes an alternative approach to
federalism, one based on Ronald Coase's original insight regarding the
transferability or "tradability" of legal rights. 16 Coase was the first
economist to point out that legal rights-such as the right to pollute or the
right to clean air-can in principle be traded, so long as those rights are
well defined and transaction costs are low.'7 It is this seemingly simple
insight-the idea that legal rights, like other goods and services, are factors
of production and thus transferable assets-upon which Coase's
famous theorem (Coase, 1960) and the whole of "law and economics" are
built. 8
This paper extends this insight into the realm of constitutional law: if
the right to emit x amount of pollution can be traded in
a specialized pollution market, then why cannot the right to operate the post
office or enforce antitrust laws be traded in a similarly specialized
"federalism market"? Robert Nozick defines legal rights broadly to include
the right to regulate behavior and enforce laws: "rights of enforcement are
themselves merely rights; that is, permissions to do something and
obligations on others not to interfere."' 19 Accordingly, instead of engaging
in traditional constitutional/legal analysis-that is, rather than draw an
arbitrary and utterly subjective line demarcating tradable and non-tradable
legal rights-this paper proposes a new approach to the problem of
federalism, a non-arbitrary mechanism for the allocation of state and federal
powers: the creation of multiple "federalism markets." Although this
proposed system of federalism markets is more of a thought-experiment at
this early stage rather than a fully-worked out policy proposal, the main
elements of this approach can be understood as follows:
(a) First, it contemplates the wide range of governmental functions
and powers (whether state or federal) through a property-rights framework,
or Coasian lens. In this view, the legal right to provide x public good
15. See, e.g., Andreas Follesdal, FEDERALISM, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/federalism/.
16. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Comission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1,25-26 (1959).
17. See Id.
18. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (2007).
19. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 92 (1974).
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ory public service as well as the legal right to regulate the behavior of
individuals and firms in a given sector of the economy are
valuable property rights. Furthermore, Congress and the states are engaged
in a never-ending, constant-sum game"0 over these rights, competing with
one another for the right to provide public goods, such as lighthouses and
national defense, and for the right to regulate certain sectors of the
economy, such as aviation and telecommunications.
(b) Due to the intractable "level of generality" or "parallel
cases" problem,"' constitutional interpretation provides no definitive answer
or solution to the question of federalism. Some Supreme Court cases, for
example, take an expansive view of Congress's regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause,2 2 while other cases take a more narrow view of the same
clause.2 3 Additionally, the text of the Tenth Amendment provides no more
clear or useful guidance than the sparse pronouncements of the Delphic
oracle.
(c) Lastly, combining the contradictory judicial precedents and the
vagueness or open-textured nature of the constitutional text, with the
property-rights or Coasian conception of state and federal governmental
powers, this paper proposes the creation of alternative "federalism markets"
in which governmental powers and functions would be allocated to
Congress or the states through decentralized auction mechanisms and
secondary markets. Under this approach, Congress and the states would bid
and thus explicitly compete against each other for the right to assume
governmental powers or functions.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the connection between the
Constitution and markets is neither new nor novel. The Takings Clause,2 4
for example, was explicitly designed to protect private property rights and
thus promote voluntary exchange by limiting the government's power of
eminent domain.25 Likewise, one could argue that the Search and Seizure
Clause 26 promotes markets by protecting both real and personal property-
i.e., "persons, houses, papers, and effects"Ifrom unreasonable police
20. See ANATOL RAPAPORT, GAME THEORY AS A THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 2 (1974)
(defining "constant sum" games as those "where the sum of the payoffs to the players is the same in
each outcome.").
21. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73 80
(1991); NOZICK, supra note 19 at 277-79.
22. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
24. U.S. CONST. amend V.
25. See Bruce L. Benson, The Evolution of Eminent Domain, 12 INDEP. REV. 423, 431 (2008). But see
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
26. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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interference.27 In addition, the First Amendment can be seen through a
market lens. The Free Speech Clause,28 for example, not only promotes
robust political debate but also furthers the free exchange of ideas. 9
Similarly, some have argued that the Establishment Clause30 was designed
not only to protect religious minorities but also to promote a free and open
"religious market" by preventing Congress and the States from favoring one
religious sect over another. 31 Essentially, these constitutional rights protect
and promote not only markets in goods and services but also the
marketplace of ideas. 32 Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed that "men
have realized that ... the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market ... That, at any rate, is the theory
of our Constitution." 33 Within this context, it appears possible to argue that
rights to exercise governmental powers can themselves be traded or
transferred.
III. FEDERALISM MARKETS
Having modeled state-federal disputes as a game of chicken and
explained the theoretical background regarding the transferability or
"tradability" of legal rights, including the right to provide public goods and
the right to enforce rights, this paper proceeds to outline a simple two-part
model of the proposed system of federalism markets. In summary, this
model incorporates the use of auctions as well as secondary markets for the
allocation of state-federal powers.
A. Auctions
One possible market mechanism for the allocation of federal-state
powers is the use of auctions. Since Coase's proposal regarding the
allocation of broadcast rights, 34 the use of auctions for the transfer of
property rights and other entitlements has become widespread.3 5 Under this
27. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 807-09 (1994).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (London, John W. Parker & Son, 1859).
30. See generally id.
31. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION, (Robert S. Alley ed., Prometheus 1999).
32. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384,
384-85 (1974).
33. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. See Coase, supra note 16 at 1; see also Leo Herzel, Public Interest and the Market in Color
Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 802, 810 n. 54 (1951).
35. See PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004).
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approach, governmental power and functions would be transferred (either
individually or in bundles) through an auction mechanism. 36 Instead of
selling an asset, such as a painting or the rights to a professional sports
franchise, the auctioneer would sell governmental power, such as the right
to provide a certain public good or service or the right to regulate a given
area of the economy. 37
This approach is often referred to in economics and game theory
literature as "mechanism design." 38 It offers several potential advantages:
(1) auctions are an effective and proven method of raising public revenue, 39
(2) properly-designed auctions are able to solve asymmetrical information
problems through the revelation of private information, 4° and most
important, (3) auctions allow rights to gravitate to those parties who value
them the most.41 However, one must address the problem of how such an
auction mechanism would work in practice, who would conduct the
auction of public services, and how the states would overcome free-rider 42
and collective-action problems 43 during the auction process?
In general, an all-powerful or centralized auctioneer might not be
practical in the context of state-federal competition. After all, it would be
impossible to select between the states or the federal government to regulate
and oversee the auctioneer: as this question is precisely the problem this
paper attempts to solve. Accordingly, instead of a sole, centralized
auctioneer, perhaps each administrative or regulatory agency (both at the
state and federal levels) could operate as a potential auctioneer of its
existing as well as new functions and powers. This proposed system of
decentralized of mini-auctions offers "several advantages.
One advantage is logistical: auctions convert an intractable and long-
standing political/ constitutional problem into a practical and soluble
economic one, for the optimal federal-state balance of power would be
decided through markets instead of courts.44 That is, rather than rely on a
36. See id
37. See id
38. See id
39. See, e.g., John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 145, 159-60 (1994).
40. See, e.g., Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973); Roger
Myerson, Incentive-Compativility and the Bargaining Problem, 47 ECONOMETRICA 61 (1979).
41. See, e.g., Gibbard, supra note 40 at 587.
42. See PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 260 (Jan J. Boersema & Lucas Reijnders eds.,
2009) (defining the "free-rider problem" as one in which actors who choose sub-optimal behavior
benefit from the sacrifices if actors who choose optimal behavior).
43. See KEITH M. DOWDING, POWER 31 (1996) (defining "collective action problems" as ones in which
a group of individuals "find it difficult to coordinate their actions to secure their group interest").
44. See id
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government agency's self-serving assessments of whether it has the
political or constitutional authority to provide a certain public good or
public service (or whether it has the authority to regulate a given area of the
economy), and rather than trusting the federal courts to make this important
policy choice, each administrative agency would instead have to compete
with other governmental agencies as well as private firms for the right to
provide such a public good or service.
Another significant advantage of auctions in place of litigation is that
this proposed system of mini-auctions would allow for trial-and-error
experimentation and is thus broadly consistent with the underlying spirit of
the Constitution and the principle of federalism. 45 In essence, by allowing
each administrative agency at both the state and federal levels to conduct its
own series of mini-auctions, each agency could experiment with a wide
variety of auction procedures. Although each agency would have an
incentive to adopt fair and efficient procedures to maximize its auction
revenues, this decentralized approach would also produce a multiplicity of
"federalism markets" through a wide variety of localized auction
mechanisms.
Lastly and most importantly, the resulting competition in these
federalism markets, or markets for governmental powers, would (in theory,
at least) maximize gross social benefits, minus the cost of providing public
goods and services, because such governmental powers would be allowed
to gravitate into the hands of bidders who value them the most.46 For
example, if a certain federal agency enjoys a comparative or absolute
advantage (as the case may be) in a certain area or subject matter, it would
be able to outbid state agencies for the right to regulate that subject matter.
Or in the alternative, if the efficient result were no regulation (neither state
nor federal), then private firms could outbid both the states and the federal
government to limit governmental power altogether.
B. Secondary markets
Another market-based approach to federal-state relations involves the
creation and legalization of secondary federalism markets. That is, in
addition to decentralized auctions, state and federal agencies could trade or
sell their existing powers and functions to other agencies as well as private
firms. The specific rules and regulations that would apply to these
45. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
46. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 39.
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secondary markets would vary, of course, depending on the type of
governmental power or function to be traded, but overall, these secondary
federalism markets would share the following five fundamental features:
First, state and federal governmental agencies would not be required to
auction their existing powers or functions, thus neutralizing any objections
based on the endowment effect or divestiture aversion.47 All new powers
and functions, however, would be allocated through decentralized auction
mechanisms.
Second, once such powers are allocated with auctions, the rights to
those powers as well as the rights to their existing powers would be
transferable or alienable through secondary markets. That is, each agency
would now be free to sell or transfer its powers to willing buyers, and
similarly, willing buyers would be able to purchase or buy out
governmental powers from willing rights-holders.
Third, the price of such market transfers would be set by these
secondary constitutional markets themselves, that is, by both the supply and
demand of governmental powers. Accordingly, such prices would (again, in
theory) reflect their true social costs.
Fourth, these market transactions would be governed in the main by
the common law of torts, contracts, and property (i.e., state law), perhaps
with the possibility of review in the US Supreme Court.
Fifth, to promote vigorous competition in such secondary markets,
there would be few, if any, formal barriers to entry. 48 Thus, willing buyers
and sellers might include state and federal governmental entities, business
firms, and even private charities as well as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
In general, such secondary-markets, like this proposed system of
mini-auctions, offer three fundamental advantages over the traditional, legal
approach to the problem of federalism. One major advantage is that such
secondary trading will tend to promote the efficient specialization of the
factors of production through Ricardian comparative advantage. 9 Once
one recognizes that the provision of public goods and the enforcement of
laws (i.e., the traditional functions and powers of state and federal
47. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39 (1980); Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endownment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
48. See MARC LIEBERMAN & ROBERT E. HALL, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 496-97 (Jack W.
Calhoun et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
49. See, e.g., id.
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governments) are factors of production, the logic of this argument becomes
transparent at once: those regulatory functions in which state or local
agencies have a comparative advantage (or absolute advantage, as the case
may be), due to such factors as geography, subject matter, existing
expertise, etc., will tend to gravitate toward the states, while those functions
in which federal agencies or private firms enjoy a comparative or absolute
advantage will end up in the proper hands as well through the market
mechanisms proposed in this paper, that is, either through auctions or
secondary trading.
Another important advantage of secondary markets (and auctions,
for that matter) is that such a market-based approach promises to achieve
the "optimal level" of governmental regulation, whether state, federal, or
private. 50 In essence, by requiring each relevant agency or firm to purchase
its regulatory powers, either through auctions or secondary markets, the
resulting prices will be set by the demand for such regulations and the
number of potential suppliers.5 1 That is, prices would reflect the individual
choices of many actors and also aggregate each participant's private
information. 52 As a result, the potential purchasers of such regulatory
powers will have less of an incentive to oversupply (or undersupply, for that
matter) their law-enforcement/public-goods-provision services since trading
in such regulatory powers will reflect these objective supply and demand
conditions.
A third advantage of this approach is that it should reduce the
number of legal disputes over the question of federalism. 53 In general, a
system of well-defined and transferable property rights reduces wasteful
disputes over ownership by keeping track of who owns what resources and
allowing such resources to gravitate toward their highest-valued uses. 54
When property rights are poorly defined or under-enforced, 55 in contrast,
resources are dissipated in unproductive squabbles over ownership. 56
Worse yet, poorly-defined/under-enforced property rights produces a
50. See Coase, supra at 43-44 (1960); Coase, supra note 32 at 390.
51. See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECoN. REV. 526 (1945).
52. See LIEBERMAN & HALL, supra note 48 at 331 32; e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated
Powers ofStates, 3 NEV. L. J. 469, 481 83 (2003).
53. LIEBERMAN & HALL, supra note 48 at 321; see NOZICK, supra note 19 at 276-77.
54. NOZICK, supra note 61 at 276-77.
55. See LIEBERMAN & HALL, supra note 48 at 321 (2nd ed. 2005).
56. Nozick, supra note 19 at 276-77.
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vacuum in which more people end up "defecting," that is, devoting more
time and energy to stealing resources from others, instead of producing
socially useful goods and services.5
Nevertheless, many technical as well as philosophical objections
may impede the creation and operation of these proposed system federalism
markets. This paper now proceeds to highlight and discuss both sets of
objections.
IV. TECHNICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO FEDERALISM
MARKETS
A. Technical objections
There are several potential problems with the proposed system of
federalism markets. One possible pitfall, especially with the decentralized
mini-auctions, is the problem of asymmetrical information. 58 Since each
agency would simultaneously participate in as well as conduct its own
auctions, it would have access to and direct control over competing bids and
would thus be privy to the bids of its competitors. 59 Thus, it could be
argued that the auctioning agency would enjoy an unfair informational
advantage over its competitors. Nevertheless, this informational problem
could be remedied through an auction clearinghouse or other neutral
mechanism. Instead of submitting bids directly to the auctioning agency
itself, all bids would be sent under seal to an independent clearinghouse.
Each agency would still auction its functions, but a clearinghouse would
receive the resulting bids and would not reveal them until after all bids were
duly submitted.
From the state or local perspective, another possible problem with
the use of federalism markets is the free-rider or collective-action
problem. 60 One could argue that massive and well-funded federal agencies
would be able to consistently and systematically outbid smaller state
agencies and private firms in the rough-and-tumble competition for
regulatory rights. How could multiple state agencies coordinate their
efforts to overcome the collective-action problem and compete with federal
agencies? Again, a clearinghouse or other aggregation mechanism should
57. MILGROM, supra note 35, at 247-49 (2004).
58. Id. at 248-49.
59. LIEBERMAN & HALL, supra note 48 at 331 32.
60. Id. at 357.
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be able to remedy this potential collective-action problem.61 Many regional
as well as national state-level organizations already exist for this purpose,
such as the National Governors' Association (NGA), the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), and the North
American Gaming Regulators Association (NAGRA), just to name a few.
These existing organizations (as well as newly-created ones) would be able
to coordinate and aggregate the resources of their members and thus
effectively compete with private firms and federal agencies in the
federalism market.
Lastly, perhaps the most serious objection to this market-based
approach is that federalism markets would be too "thin"-that is, markets
with too few buyers and sellers.62 Thin markets are characterized by high
volatility and high bid-ask spreads because when the number of buyers and
sellers in a given market is small, each participant's share of the market is
large relative to the overall market size, resulting in inefficient valuation of
assets and high market volatility. 63  This potential thinness problem,
however, could easily be corrected by opening the market for federal-state
powers to private firms and by allowing multiple administrative agencies
within the same level of government to participate in the federalism market
as well. For example, one could imagine not only the federal
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) but also other state and
federal governmental agencies (such as Customs, the FBI, and State
National Guards) as well as a large number of private firms bidding to
provide airport security.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the market approach for the
provision of public goods, and the idea of property rights in governmental
powers generally, is already fairly common in many countries around the
world, specifically, the emerging practice of public-private joint ventures or
so-called "public-private partnerships" (PPPs) in many vital sectors of the
economy, including energy, telecommunications, transportation, as well as
water and sanitation services. 64 Since a significant fraction of new large-
scale infrastructure projects are now in the form of public-private joint
ventures or PPPs, and since this trend is likely to continue into the
61. See, e.g., Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, Thin Markets, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008), available at
http://www.dictionaryof economics.com/article?id-pde2008 T000249.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., F.E. Guerra-Pujol, A Tale of Two Joint Ventures: Jiangsu, China, and Havana, Cuba: A
Game Theoretic Analysis of Public Private Contracts in the Water Sector 1 3 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) avalilable at http://works.bepress.com/f e guerra pujol/8.
64. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 93 (1972).
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foreseeable future, these facts suggest that the above technical objections
can be overcome and that the market-based model presented in this paper
may potentially have a wide application.
B. Philosophical objections
Putting aside the technical objections to this proposed system of
federalism markets, one must also recognize that certain legal
entitlements--especially constitutional rights or so-called fundamental
rights (i.e., "human rights")-have historically been deemed
as "inalienable" since the founding of the Republic. 65 But it should not be a
foregone conclusion that some rights be treated as transferable assets and
others not. After all, if such inalienable rights were
truly "fundamental," then presumably no one would ever be willing to buy
or sell them in the first place. Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked: "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry TV."166 But aside from legal tradition and the
vagaries of history, what justifies the current, long-standing paternalistic
view of federalism and constitutional rights generally? There are two
possible philosophical objections to the idea of federalism markets (and
trading in constitutional rights generally) and neither of these objections are
particularly persuasive.
The principal argument against the transferability of constitutional
rights, including the right to enforce rights, is that markets in certain types
of goods and services might degrade or somehow undermine society's most
deepest and cherished values, such as human dignity.67 Call this the
"human dignity argument"-the classical Kantian argument that persons
should be valued and respected as ends in themselves and not as means. 68
But putting aside the intractable level of generality problem-how does
society go about defining the meaning of such a fuzzy, open-textured, and
subjective term as "human dignity"?-the human-dignity argument is the
easiest to refute and brush aside.
Consider the market for water and sanitation services. These
essential utilities are no doubt necessary not only for human dignity and
human flourishing but also for human survival. 69 Despite this fact, most
governments not only impose fees for providing these essential services,
65. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
66. Id.
67. JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (4th ed. 2002).
68. See, e.g., id.
69. Guerra-Pujol, supra note 63.
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and many governments, including socialist ones, have been able to improve
and extend water and sanitation services to poor communities through a
wide variety of privatization mechanisms. 70 In other words, whether or not
a certain right-whether it be the right to water or the right to enforce
rights-should be tradeable depends less on utterly subjective moral or
vague human dignity considerations than on the practical effects or
consequences resulting from tradeability. In essence, water and sanitation
networks as well as law-enforcement services are "public goods," and there
are costs and benefits to society of providing such public goods. The
human dignity argument, standing alone, is simply irrelevant to the question
of whether these public goods should be provided by a publicly-owned or
privately-owned firm, or to the question raised in this paper: whether the
right to provide such public services should itself be traded through a
system of auctions and secondary markets.
Another argument against federalism markets is that the rights to be
traded on such markets are "incommensurable"-that is, certain rights
cannot be measured in dollars or otherwise quantified or measured on some
scale. 71 The incommensurability argument is a powerful one: not only is it
morally wrong to commodify certain types of rights (i.e., non-market
goods, such as the right to life), but it is also unfeasible to do so because
there is no common metric for measuring or quantifying the economic value
of such non-market goods.72 That is, even if there were no moral objections
to commodification, it would still be impossible to accurately reduce non-
market objects into monetary terms. Although this is a strong argument, it
too is easily refutable (or, at least, rebuttable) for the following reasons:
first, non-market goods can, in fact, be reduced to money value as a matter
of routine. 73 Insurance markets and legal actors, for example, already
perform this remarkable feat on a daily basis. 74 The classic example is the
award of money damages in tort cases, in which judges and juries are
required to put an economic value to human pain and suffering as well as to
the loss of life and limb. 7 Likewise, the insurance industry could not exist
but for its ability to monetize human life expectancy. 6
70. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMIcS 52-55 (Harvard Univ. Press
1993)..
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 783-87 (Aspen Publishers 8th ed., 2004).
75. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Do Markets Degrade?, 59 MOD. L. REv. 331, 336 (1996).
76. Id. at 335-36.
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In addition, arguments based on the incommensurability of non-market
goods (including related arguments based on "human dignity") are
themselves incommensurable, like disputes about aesthetics or religious
doctrines, since such arguments are ultimately premised on highly-
contested and utterly subjective underlying normative values. Simply put,
moral problems are inherently insoluble because moral values themselves
are incommensurable. 77  Of course, one could argue that market
mechanisms are also based on a competing and thus incommensurable
conception of morality, such as the idea of wealth maximization, 78 but at the
very least, market mechanisms allow each participant in the relevant market
to express her own personal moral preferences through her individual
trading decisions, rather than having someone else's moral preferences
(however sincere or strong) imposed on her by preventing her from trading
at all. 79
But perhaps the main weakness with both the incommensurability
and human-dignity arguments is the inevitability of trade-offs.80 In essence,
these arguments appear to pretend that rights and non-market goods
generally are somehow magically immune to the problem of trade-offs. But
trade-offs are everywhere; even non-market goods must be traded off
against each other.81 For example, there is no doubt that friendship is an
incommensurable value, but in deciding how much time I should spend
with my friends, I must still forego other competing and valuable uses of
my time. Since trade-offs must also be made in the context of federal-state
disputes over power, the question boils down to this: which institution
should make these trade-offs? Markets or the legal system?
In closing, the three main advantages of a market-based approach to
federalism are worth repeating: auctions and secondary markets not only
promise to achieve the proper federal-state balance of power, they also
promise to deliver the efficient or optimal level of regulation by avoiding
too much as well as too little regulation.82 In addition, federalism markets
promise to transform an essentially indeterminate constitutional question
into a soluble economic problem.8 3  In place of the longstanding,
indeterminate, and unproductive constitutional dispute over the proper
77. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 27
(1979).
78. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books 1974).
79. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 92-93 (1978).
80. Id.
81. R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 384, 384-86
(1974); Daniel Kahneman et al., 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325-26 (1990).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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allocation of federal-state powers-a legal dispute in which the contending
federal and state interests continually make self-serving and unfalsifiable
assertions-each administrative agency would have to decide whether to
purchase or sell (either through auctions or through secondary markets) its
powers and functions.84 Under this approach, markets-not courts or
constitutional scholars-would solve the federalism problem.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to outline a new approach to the problem
of federalism, a market, property-rights approach. Although the idea of
transferable or tradeable legal entitlements-and the underlying idea of
property rights in legal entitlements generally-is not new, what is arguably
new is this broad conception of such tradeable legal entitlements. This
view of legal entitlements includes not only legal rights to perform certain
actions as well as legal rights to prohibit third parties from performing
certain actions, but also extends the Coasian concept of legal entitlements to
include governmental power itself, that is, to the right to create new rights
and to enforce existing rights. In summary, this market-based approach to
federalism promises to transform an indeterminate constitutional question
into a soluble economic problem. In place of the longstanding,
indeterminate, and unproductive constitutional dispute over the proper
allocation of federal-state powers, each administrative agency would have
to decide whether to purchase or sell-either through auctions or through
secondary markets-its powers and functions. Under this approach,
markets-not courts or constitutional scholars-would solve the federalism
problem.
84. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1959); Coase, supra
note 2 at 1 (1960).
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